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

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Contradictions in the Khilafat Movement & Transformations in Abul Kalam Azad: A Historical Analysis of Muslim Politics in British India – 1912–1947

ROSINA NASIR

Abstract

Indian nationalists considered the Khilafat Movement of 1919–1924 in India as an anti-colonial movement by the Indian Muslims. Most studies on the Khilafat movement perceive it as a pan-Islamic supranational phenomenon against the British hostility toward the Sultan of Turkey. This movement provided a platform for Indian Muslim leaders, such as Abul Kalam Azad, who represented Muslim politics in post-independence India. This paper aims to unravel the trajectory of the Khilafat Movement in India and its unity with the Indian Non-Cooperation Movement. Moreover, this paper examines the effect of this confluence that prompted change in the political ideology of Abul Kalam Azad, thereby influencing his path toward becoming a national leader in Hindu majority India.

Keywords: *Khilafat Movement; Imamat; Abul Kalam Azad; Siyasi Markaz*

Introduction

The perception of the British government in India toward Muslims after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 had changed. After the Mutiny of 1857, the British government finally eliminated Mughal rule and all symbolic structures of their authority. The role of Muslims in the Mutiny has not been definitively assessed to date. However, two points are consistent: First, the British were determined to suppress and enfeeble Muslims after facing intense hostility from them in Delhi and in Oudh, and second, the political future of Muslim leaders and community was seen as extremely bleak.

In this setting, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan emerged as a leader and guide for Muslims in India. He promoted loyalty toward the British colonial rulers and attempted to minimize the grounds of animosity, which Muslims likely harbored against the British. He was persuading the Muslims to maintain distance from the Congress. Furthermore, he initiated the religious reformation of Islam based on Western rationalism and aimed to convince educated Muslims that Islam and the British rule are not in contrast to but are consistent with each other.

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Struggle of Muslims for Political Space Preceding the Khilafat Movement

After approximately 50 years of effort by Sir Sayyid Ahmad, a pro-British image was developed among Muslims and Muslims were encouraged to participate in socio-political spheres. A Muslim majority province was carved through the division of Bengal in 1905 by Lord Curzon, which was the result of negotiation for the political participation of Muslims. The Muslims of East Bengal (the new province) welcomed the Indian government with a hope that the new province will provide opportunities for Muslims to improve their lives. However, Bengali upper-caste Hindus agitated and refused to accept the division of Bengal. To pressurize the Indian government for annulment, the *Swadeshi* movement[1] was started by Aurobindo Ghosh, Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, Lal Lajpat Rai and V.O. Chidambaram Pillai, in which British products were boycotted. Bengalis had been among the founding-fathers of the Indian National Congress and actively involved to draw up all-India demands. So, the Congress had been very solicitous about Bengal. In 1903, when the first hint of partition was leaked, the Congress passed a resolution condemning the proposal, and this was repeated in 1904.[2]

Later, in 1906, British Viceroy Lord Minto and Secretary of State John Morley, were getting worried that the Congress, which they saw as a predominately Hindu body, was becoming too powerful as diverse sections were joining it. So, the Indian Councils Act of 1909, also called the Morley-Minto reforms, was introduced in India, which provided Muslims the right for separate electorates. However, this concession was promoted as the reward for Muslims' loyalty to the British government. The Congress leaders were enraged and disapproved this concession as they saw the reforms as the means to exploit the schism between Hindus and Muslims. Soon thereafter, communal tension escalated and on December 12, 1911, which was the coronation day of King George V, the partition was annulled by the Royal Proclamation in Delhi.

The announcement of the annulment disappointed the Muslims. Moreover, the concern of the Aligarh Muslim University further created resentment against the Indian government. Muslims aimed to improve the affiliation of Aligarh College to Muslim University. However, in 1912, the Secretary of State for India declined the request. The annulment of the partition of Bengal and refusal of the demand for Aligarh Muslim University contributed to the belief that the old political attitude required change. This betrayal by the British government enraged the Muslims and resulted in political actions by the Muslims through different means.

The Muslims were divided into three factions: 1) pro-government, who were loyal to the British government; 2) reformists, who sought more electoral power; and 3) rejectionists, who considered reform schemes inadequate. Because of the instability of negotiations for a political space and disappointments, the Muslim League virtually disappeared after the First World War. Rejectionists formed the *Young Party Ulema* group led by Mualanas Muhamad Ali, Shawkat Ali and Abdul Bari who were advocating the cause of pan-Islamism through the All India Khilafat Organization[3] which comprised of "militants"[4] and *ulema* (religious leaders). The participants of the Young Muslims group were willing to cooperate with Hindu nationalists under the conditions that their identity as Muslims was protected and they received the agreed benefits.[5] These participants primarily belonged to the United Provinces[6] and had abandoned the old style of chamber politics; they were braving the politics of mass mobilization and aimed to participate in agitational politics. In the Young Muslims group, a section of low socio-economic status emerged as a more radical element, which opted for extra parliamentary

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forms of struggle instead of entering the council because they were aware that the latter approach is difficult. The Young Muslims group not only promoted the cause of the Khilafat movement but also advocated it by forming the All Indian Khilafat Organization, whereas other factions conducted minimum activities. The loyalists and reformists were equally disappointed with the British and frustrated as a political minority. However, these factions never considered the Caliph position with Ottomans as a political center, which was then the symbol of Islamic power worldwide.

Relevance of the Khilafat Movement in the Indian Context

Abdul Hamid in his study, *Muslim Separatism in India: A brief survey*, states that "the Khilafat movement arose from circumstances that had nothing to do with India. It will go down in history as a disinterested and altruistic movement animated by solicitude for another reason."[7] He elaborates that the movement was initiated to maintain the unity of Islam; however, the following questions are unanswered: why were Indian Muslims inclined for the cause, because Islam was not threatened in the then India, and what motivated them to struggle for it? Arabs were followers of Islam; however, they were governed by internal/local/national circumstances and not by the Islamic unity, which was proffered by the Ottomans. The Caliphate was abolished in post-First World War Turkey in response to the internal political circumstances; however, its continuance in India based on the instinctively carried faith of the Muslims was surprising.[8]

Indian Muslims, particularly the religious scholars among them, were only inclined toward the Ottoman Empire and not its Sultans/Caliphs. For them sustenance of the political hegemony under the flagship of Islam was sacrosanct and not the type of governance. Earlier, they had lent support to the monarchic and autocratic rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid but later became allegiant to the secular regime of the Young Turks, who deposed Sultan Abdul Hamid. They supported the Turkish secular regime irrespective of the fact that pan-Islamic ideology of extraterritorial and transnational unity around religion does not coalesce with territorial and composite elements of secular regime. Therefore, the Khilafat movement was concerned with power and not piety and a pan-Islamic movement was formed to influence the course of events within India. Gail Minault emphasized that the Khilafat movement used pan-Islamic symbols to forge a pan-Indian Muslim constituency.[9] Their efforts to seek support and associate with Turkey were to maintain the political importance of the Muslim minority in India. This movement was not related to anti-or-pro British sentiments. Furthermore, in the late 19th century, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who was a loyalist and the founder of Aligarh College, urged Indian Muslims to stay loyal to the British and emulate the progressive reforms of the Ottoman Empire by forgoing religious prejudices and adopting European arts and sciences.[10]

With these concerns, this paper aims to understand the influence of local political circumstances in Turkey on Muslim politics in India and to comprehend the profound interest of religious scholars in this when other political factions were negligible. Moreover, this paper attempts to understand the approach used to manage their interest and to overcome the plights of the then Indian Muslims. Was religious affiliation the only connection between these scholars and the Muslim politics? How did the Ottoman Empire and its Sultans, who were confidants of the British, became antagonistic toward them? How did this transformation affect the concerns of the Indian Muslims? Was the Khilafat movement a strategy to fight against the common enemy? If so, as per the statements, was the British Empire inimical to the Ottomans? Were the British Indian Muslims sympath-

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etic toward the Ottoman Empire because of the religious similarity? Was this strategy a pressure tactic to combat the fear of the Hindu majority and thus to bargain for power?

Politics of Assertion of Religious Leadership in the Ottoman Empire

Muslim leaders associated with the Khilafat movement in India seemed to be unaware of the internal movements within the Ottoman Empire and the political developments as well as political significance and power of the Caliphate. In 1839 under Sultan Mahmud II[11] a series of reforms termed *Tanzimat* were introduced in the Ottoman Empire.[12] These reforms included the abolition of *timars* (i.e. military fief, the material basis of Osmanli feudalism). The reforms were influenced by European ideas. This reform movement focused on secular governance by promising equality for non-Muslim subjects of the Empire because the Balkan regions were primarily the mercantile bourgeoisie of Armenian Christians and Turkish Jews, who were dominating the modern sector.

After accession to the throne, Sultan Abdul Hamid II introduced the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, which not only reconstituted progressive *Tanzimat* reforms of the preceding reign but also revived Islam as an essential element of the Ottoman political culture. Therefore, he introduced the concept of pan-Islamism[13] as a state ideology that not only organized Muslims of the British colonies against the British but also revived Caliphs to seek political leadership by putting Islam at the forefront. This attempt expanded the boundaries of political Islam and its aspiration in seeking transnational unity based on religion. However, acquiring the status of Caliph by the Ottoman Sultans was a disputed concern and was used as a polemic to assert power. In his analysis Hamza Alavi argues[14] that Al-Mutawakkil[15], who was a descendent of the Abbasids of Baghdad, could not pass on the Caliphate to Selim I or anyone because he did not have a country or any authority to transfer. Furthermore, neither Selim I nor any of his descendants for nearly three and half centuries called themselves Caliphs.

The British did not resist pan-Islamism under their jurisdiction. The British used the offices of the Turkish Caliph when dealing with the opposition of Tipu Sultan to the British presence in Southern India.[16] Moreover, the British used the office of the Caliph to pacify Muslim resistance in 1857.[17] Britain and Turkey had a long history of association and friendship, which raises the following question: why did Turkey ally with the central powers, namely Germany and Habsburg Austria?

Turkey was inclined to join Britain; however, the anti-Turk attitude of Russia caused Britain to decline the generous offer of Turkey. The Turkish government was not ready to adopt a neutral attitude, which was desired by the British through the mediation of Agha Khan[18]; however, they adopted a policy of "wait and watch" before joining Germany. In October 1914, Turkey joined Germany, thereby automatically placing Turkey against Great Britain and France.

After the war, the Young Turk leaders from the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) was dismissed, and a power vacuum was generated because the Young Turks fled into exile, and this vacuum was instantly filled by the old ruling class, with the Caliph as the head. Sultan Wahiduddin Muhammed VI[19] was appointed in 1918, which was suitable for the British. The Britain-led anti-Turk propaganda not only spared the Caliph during the war but also favored him after the war. One of the reasons for such inclination could be to exploit the loyalties and allegiances of the Muslims worldwide based on the Caliph. Resource exploitation is easier in autocratic and theocratic regimes than in democratic and secular regimes.

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After a long struggle, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk came into power in Turkey and established a secular republic in 1923. In 1924, Kemal abolished the Caliphate in the favor of the country. He exposed that the Caliph was in league with the British and European powers. Kemal was struggling against the attempt of the European powers for the monarchic rule of the Caliph in Turkey. The Khilafat movement was not introduced in India as the assertion of the Caliph's authority, and it focused on supporting the secular governance of Kemal Ataturk. The change in state boundaries changed the meaning of the Khilafat movement, which was also reflected in the Indian context.

A Journey for Leadership Before 1920: Abul Kalam Azad

Abul Kalam Azad was one of the primary leaders of the Khilafat movement. His transformation from a religious to a secular leader in freedom politics is comparable to the changing meaning of the Khilafat movement in India. In the beginning, the Khilafat movement was associated with religion and its related symbols; however, it was metamorphosed as a secular movement according to the demands of the time by juxtaposing the movement with the Non-Cooperation Movement in India. Earlier, the movement was based on the religion and politico-religious identity of the Muslims under the leadership of the *ulema*; however, it was later centered on Hindu-Muslim unity, which was a mandate of the reformist faction.

The leadership of the Indian Khilafat movement came from the cross-section of the Indian society. Several leaders, namely the Ali Brothers[20] (Muhammad Ali Jauhar, Shaukat Ali), Zafar Ali Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, Nawab Viqarul Mulk, Altaf Hussain Hali, and Shibli Nomani, supported the Turkish regime in Istanbul irrespective of their political and ideological inclinations. Among the aforementioned *ulema*, the ideologues of Abul Kalam Azad were influential. He used *Al-Hilal* Journal as a battleground by providing the largest space to news from Turkey and was interpreting political views within the framework of Islam.[21] In 1912–1922, Azad eruditely spread political and religious messages through *Al-Hilal* and was perceived as a revolutionary leader of Islam. His thoughts were dominated by *Qur'anic* teachings and political concepts of Islam. According to him, an ideal state was an Islamic state, and he was keen to organize Indian Muslims as a separate entity.

The anti-British political activity of Abul Kalam Azad was not consistent with the then existing political circumstances led by the western educated Muslims during the Aligarh movement after Sir Sayyid.[22] He did not support the Aligarh movement because of its imitation of European customs and their lack of faith, and he attacked the Muslim League for its sycophancy toward the British.[23] This anti-British stand was different from the western educated Muslims. Azad repudiated others and validated his anti-British stand, which was based on the revitalization of their cultural orientation and not on the imitation of the culture of conquerors. When discussing Jihad, Azad emphasized the religious obligation of Muslims to fight for the freedom of their country.[24] If this statement is interpreted out of context then he appears to be consistent with the Congress and reformist Muslim faction; however, he was not. Azad was suggesting that Muslims must not blindly follow the political lead of the Hindus. By contrast, the western educated Muslim determined that they must lead the fight irrespective of their minority status and must acquire space through self-assertion.[25] Therefore, Azad was repudiating the efforts of others, and he considered some of them intellectually inferior and was disdainful toward some other.

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Khilafat Movement to Attain Political Centre (*Siyasi Markaz)* of Islam

On October 27, 1914, in Calcutta, Azad elaborated on pan-Islamism in his speech. He argued that the fundamental relationship between the Indian Muslims and Ottomans is not based on the same religious fraternity but on the principle that every nation must have a political center (i.e. *siyasi markaz*). He further stated that the Turkish Caliphs are the political center of the International Muslim community and the local movements in different countries must establish the center of Islam.[26]

For Azad, the Khilafat movement was an approach to attain suitable circumstances for the World of Islam and not to achieve the freedom of India. Local endeavors in India, including the freedom movement and Hindu-Muslim unity, were to achieve the World of Islam[27] and not vice-versa. Muslim separatism was inherent in the first stage of the political philosophy of Azad, which was more influential than the Hindu-Muslim unity and freedom of India. He was more concerned with the consolidation of the Muslim community, and thus, he stated in *Al-Hilal* that Muslim University in Aligarh must bring all Muslim educational institutions under one umbrella to facilitate the socio-religious and political consolidation. He regretted that although the Indian Muslims were the largest community of Islam, they were not together.

Through *Al-Hilal*, he offered a highly exaggerated picture of a stressed Turkey. Azad considered that Muslims could not abide by secular values like the Hindus of British India; however, against his beliefs, he was supporting the Young Turks and Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), who were implementing secular and democratic values in Turkey. Furthermore, he supported the earlier regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid, which was monarchic, theocratic, and autocratic, thereby reviving pan-Islamism through the notion of Khilafat by residing its claim to the Sultan of Turkey, and Azad never penned the analysis of the CUP and power structure in Turkey.[28]

This inconsistency by supporting (i.e. theologically conservative and secular ideologies) politically diverse tendencies at different times indicates that Azad trimmed his ideology to suit political expediency. However, the reason behind these different tendencies was unclear. Was it the ignorance of facts or studied suppression of facts? One of the interpretations for the suppression of facts could be his optimism that one day the Islamist tendency or Shari'a enforcing regime will prevail against the existing secular power structure.

> Another possible interpretation is that his knowledge of the facts of West Asian and Egyptian affairs was sketchy and that he misinterpreted what little he knew because of his prior disposition to see everything in pan-Islamicist terms and in accordance with highly tendentious materials, which he had been receiving in the mail from such groupings in the Arab world, primarily Cairo.[29]

The policy of Azad in this duration was disbelief in the British government and non-cooperation with the Hindus. However, after his release from the jail in December 1919, a new layer of his personality was observed. A section in this paper aims to understand those changes and assesses the reasons. *Al-Hilal* was active for only two and a half years. After the outbreak of the First World War, the British government under the provision of the Press Act closed down *Al-Hilal* in 1914. However, Azad launched a new journal *Al-Balagh*. He was then expelled from the province of Bengal. In 1916, he was interned for three and a half years under the defense of India Provisions Act, and his entry was prohibited in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, and Bombay. He could move without any hindrance only in Bihar. However, in

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Ranchi, he was kept under house arrest. Azad was released from internment on December 31, 1919.

Azad and Religion in Indian National Politics after 1920

In 1919, the politics of Indian freedom struggle and power structure in Turkey changed after the defeat in the First World War.[30] Indian politics changed from elite-middle-class based politics to a mass-based agitation, whereas Turkey changed from a theocracy under Sultan Abdul Hamid to a secular regime – the Young Turks. In Turkey, the combined temporal and spiritual authority of the Sultan-Caliph was changed in Turkish situations in 1919.

To address the cause of Khilafat in India, a Khilafat Committee[31] was founded in 1919. What was the need of another organization in the presence of the Muslim League? Why did the Muslim League not rally the community toward the Khilafat banner? One of the reasons for the decline of the Muslim League was its loyalty and elitist constitutionalism, which did not represent the opinions of Indian Muslims at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference; however, a deputation led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah was sent to London for representing their opinions. Another reason was the need of a strictly religious organization to address the cause of Khilafat because its immediate concern was religious-political authority. After the formation of the organization, the Khilafat conference sent a deputation to the Viceroy of India to represent the perspective of Indian Muslims. The Khilafat leaders held two rounds of talks in London. On March 2, 1920, Muhammad Ali Jauhar expressed the perspectives of Indian Muslims to Lord Fisher, and on March 17, 1920, the second round of talks was held with Prime Minister David Lloyd George, wherein the Khilafat Indian leaders advocated the cause of Khilafat. A major blow to the efforts of the Khilafat leaders was received when the news of the treaty of Sèvres[32] reached India. This acceptance of the treaty by Sultan Wahiduddin VI sealed the fate of the Turkish Caliph monarchy and was seen as threat to pan-Islamic super national phenomenon. Further, this Treaty defied the principle of Khilafat, a central state authority for the entire Islamic world, from the very Law of existence of the Universe. The Khilafat leaders in India protested and wrote to Sultan Wahiduddin Muhammed VI to reject the treaty; however, his response was not desirable. This led to the emergence of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (a secularist and modernist) and the Turkish War of Independence led by him.

His subsequent victories in September 1922 against the Greeks and separate treaty with the then United Soviet States of Russia (USSR) led Ataturk to sign a new peace treaty on 24 July,1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, against the imposed the treaty of Sevres. This treaty was seen as a triumph over imperialistic ambitions and was rejoiced in India. Subsequently on 3 March, 1924 the Grand National Assembly abolished the Khilafat—"The Caliph is deposed. Functions of Caliph being essentially included in meaning and connotation of government and republic, office of Caliph is abolished."[33] This event interpreted as vacuum in the religious structure of Islam wherein, "The Caliph" symbolizes the unity of temporal and spiritual authority.

With these developments on the international scene, Azad was confused and depressed after his release from jail. Rizwan Qaiser, in his book analyzing colonialism and colonial politics in India, mentions that Azad was in the dilemma of selecting between his passion for studies, primarily theology and Quranic interpretations, and the fight for freedom, and he opted to address the national concerns.[34] However, before 1920s, he did not attend to the national concerns.

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Efforts of Azad to be the "Imam" of Indian Muslims

On the basis of conversations of Azad with A. R. Malihabadi, which were provided by I. H. Douglas in his biography of Azad[35] indicated that Azad wanted to become the Imam, that is, the leader of the Indian Muslims. He was aware that he would be accepted as Imam if the Muslims were declared un-Islamic without an Imam. He planned to form an agreement with the Hindus and declare *jihad* against the British. Malihabadi and Gulam Rasul Mihr were appointed as "Caliphs" of Azad for the United Provinces and Punjab, respectively, and took the required *bai'at.*[36] However, the other religious leaders, that is those from Deoband and Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal,[37] did not encourage this proposal, considering Muhammad Ali's efforts and effective leadership to the Khilafat movement and the difference of personality between Ali and Azad.

By the end of 1914, Azad proposed the setting up of Imarat or Imamate and the appointment of an Ameer, and he approached Mahmud Hasan of Deoband.[38] However, his visit to Mecca halted the progress of this proposal. When Azad was in Ranchi as an intern, he decided to form a provincial organization and formed *Imarat-e Sharia* as the first step. *Imarat* was defined as the political authority, and state power was in allegiance with the universal Khilafat of Islam (i.e. the Sultan of Turkey). In the Indian context, through *Imarat,* Azad wanted to create a space for the leader addressing all Indian Muslims as a homogenous category, while neglecting heterogeneity within the Indian Muslim community.

In his inaugural address delivered at the first *Bengal Provincial Khilafat Conference* held at the Calcutta Town Hall on 28–*29 February* 1920, Azad declared the following:

> The tongues of all should be speechless, only he, the Imam, should be speaking. The minds of all should be closed, only his mind should operate. The people should have neither tongues, nor minds, but only hearts, which should accept (what is told), and have hands and feet to toil and work and run about.[39]

Religion Over Political Rights Mend the Way for Azad

Numerous attempts were made for Hindu-Muslim unity, including the Allahabad conference of Hindu Muslim leaders in 1910, endorsement of suitable self-government by the Muslim League in 1913, and Lucknow Pact in 1916.[40] However, how was the Khilafat movement different from previous negotiations to achieve unity? The Khilafat movement witnessed a major shift in the leadership style. The barrister leadership of the Congress and Muslim League exhibited a new type of political leaders, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Muslim leaders with religious and emotional appeals. Because of this style of Gandhi, he acknowledged the extraterritorial allegiance of the Muslims, which was expressed through Caliphate agitation, and he attempted to translate Muslims' proclivity to Turkey through a Hindu-Muslim cooperation program by connecting the Khilafat movement with the Indian Non-Cooperation Movement.[41]

The treaty of Sèvres was resented by Gandhi, and he then declared that the Non-Cooperation Movement was the only effective remedy for healing the wounds inflicted upon the Mohammedan trust on the Khilafat movement.[42] This strategic move of Gandhi saved the Indian National Congress from the blame of being called a Hindu body and metamorphosed its image as a national party by creating a space for Muslims through the religious leaders, such as Mualana Azad[43] and different religious scholars from Deoband, Firangi Mahal, Barelli, Rampur, and *Nadvat-ul-Ulema* of Lucknow. Understanding why Mahatma Gandhi did not approach or negotiate with the Western

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educated Muslims and selected *Jamiatul-Ulema* (a religious organization on Islam)[44], or spiritual leaders, such as Abul Kalam Azad, over the followers of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan is essential. This attempt could be considered in the opposition of the Muslim League demands that sought a share in the power structure and their fight to obtain a separate electorate. Therefore, Gandhi, who supported the Montague-Chelmsford Reform of 1919, changed his mind and campaigned against the reforms. Thus, a possible explanation for providing a space for religious scholars/leaders could be that accommodating religious leadership, which was more concerned with political authority based on *Shari'a* in the Hindu majority, was easier than cooperating with the newly educated Muslims, who demanded for development and authority.

Inclusive Trade-off

This background helps to understand how Azad and other *ulema* were in agreement and had reinforced the scheme of Gandhi. Therefore, they supported the entry of religion, which was also their primary concern, in the political space through an uncontested and secular approach. Why was Azad selected as the President of the Indian National Congress in 1923 despite his brief association? Apart from circumstantial reasons and communal riots in the post-Khilafat period, the aforementioned occurrence could be attributed to his inclination toward Gandhi and his constructive work.

The selection of Azad helped the Congress to substantiate on numerous concerns. Azad was selected to moderate the deteriorating communal situation in the country in the post-Khilafat period. However, the selection of Azad provided several advantages, including the provision of an inclusive and secular image to the Congress and the increased number of Gandhi followers, such as Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, M. A. Ansari, Rajagopalachari, and Srinivasa Iyengar, for holding the internal power structure. All these revisions of principles affected Azad, who redirected himself in the direction of the changing political situation. The Khilafat movement and his inclusion in the Congress provided him an opportunity to become the Imam, the political-religious leader of the community, and to realize his ambition, he gave up his principles, which he promoted through *Al-Hilal* days and used as a premise for his political activity.

Actualization of *Imamat*

Although the ideal of collaborative politics between the Hindus and Muslims was employed during the combined Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movements, the grand alliance was already damaged by the Malabar rebellion in 1921.[45] It damaged the Hindu-Muslim relations, and thus, on February 5, 1922, the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat Movement (NCKM) was withdrawn, which offended many Muslim leaders in Congress.[46] At this time, Azad was in jail and released on January 1, 1923. The political understanding of Azad at that time can be based on the account of Abdur Razzaq Malihabadi through his conversations with Azad. According to Azad, *swaraj* meant a good government, which was conditioned upon two factors: nationalist characteristics and democratic functioning.[47] The views of Azad changed with situations because during his early phase, Azad did not consider democracy an appropriate approach. He stated that democracy was accorded a subordinate status in the Islamic scheme of life.[48]

The political history of Islam and Turkey must be neglected to accept the unclear and arbitrary explanations of Azad. Without profound knowledge on the relation of the Caliph with the British in the Ottoman Empire, Azad claimed that the Islamic *Shari'ah*

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law states that in every age, Muslims must have "one" (*ek) Khalifa* and *Imam* (i.e. the Universal Caliph). He did not provide a source of that *Shari'ah* law or a basis for the aforementioned statement. He was accustomed to making extravagant claims without providing any foundation from the basic sources of Islam. His audience might have been ill-informed and thus captivated by the fluency of his rhetoric with long "quotations" in Arabic, which was the like the first language of Azad**.** They could not reflect on the veracity of Azad's claims.

The final blow to the institution of the Khilafat was received when the Turkish National Assembly deposed the Caliph, abolished the Khilafat, and banished all surviving members of the Ottoman dynasty.[49] The response of Azad was quite different from that of other Khilafat leaders in India. Azad refused to accept the event and stated that it was a disinformation campaign conducted by the Western media. He promised to provide the religious interpretation of the decision by the Turkish National Assembly in the subsequent issue of the paper,[50] however, it was never published. He stated that Khilafat was not valid for political mobilization in the changed political circumstances. This opinion was significantly different from his *Al-Hilal* days. This change in his views might correspond with the changed political stand after 1920, which included his plan to achieve Imarat through Hindu-Muslim unity. By contrast, Ali brothers were determined to bypass the Turkish decision and organized a Mo'tamar-e-Islami to persuade Ibn Saud of Arabia for transferring the control of Islamic holy places to an elected Khilafat.

When reflecting on the subject Azad stated the following:

> It is true that for centuries the institution of Khilafat has been personalized. Barring the first 30 years of Islam and two or three years of Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz[51], the entire history of Islam is that of the personalized rule. However, the solution of the problem is not to abolish the institution itself. The answer is to create a proper Islamic Khalifa. The creation of such an institution will not be against the larger principles of democracy and national liberation. On the contrary, it will be well in accordance with its spirit.[52]

This stand of Azad was the characteristic of his changing personality. Not only was he deftly creating space to the idea of "proper Islamic Khalifa" and procedure how to select him, but also attempting to view the institution of Khilafat through secular and modernity lens. Further, he clearly interpreted that Khilafat was not abolished because the Republic of Turkey remained an Islamic power, and its government could be considered the same. However, this stand did not implement the sanction of Islam and *Shari'ah* because no such reference can be found in the history of Islam. Therefore, because of the inconsistency of the stand by Azad in different political circumstances, he became a ploy of the Indian National Congress, which could be considered a misfortune of the Muslims in British India because it affected their bargaining power in the political and related spheres.

Discussion

Azad started his career as a Khilafist through his journal *Al-Hilal,* where he described the Turkish Sultan and the Caliphate as symbols of Islamic power, which became a charade, that is, an imperialist façade. Although he visited Turkey, he did not discuss the war between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans and other regions supporting the CUP, and according to Azad's autobiography, this Committee was against Islamicists. He

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did not describe the local struggles and political upheaval of the Indian Muslims. After the complete launch of the campaign to restore Khilafat in India, the fate of the Turkish institution was sealed by the defeat.

The conflation of Khilafat with the Indian non-corporation movement was strategic for the interests of Gandhi and Azad. However, Gandhi's interest was related to the community because he supported the suppression of separate electorates; however, Azad's stand was individualistic. The Khilafat movement for Azad was an opportunity to lead the Muslim community. He articulated the concept of Imamat to representatives of different religious schools and attempted to generate consensus. Because of the disinterest of the *ulema* and his visit to Mecca, this aim could not be executed. The possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity under the NCKM[53] was utilized by Azad, and thus, he was providing an example of the Turkish regime, which was fervent in religious faith and was united behind its Khalifa. In view of the above example, Azad, was proposing himself as a religio-political leader and was expecting the Sub-continent's Muslims to be united under his leadership.

With the change of geo-political situation, that is, after the First World War, the Indian Khilafat leaders supported the secular governance by Mustafa Kamel Ataturk, whereas the British aspired for Turkish Caliph Monarchy. It is an interesting fact that the Indian Khilafat leaders' proclivity was for the political authority of Islam, however the change in ruler and his ideology, from monarchy to secular, was not their priority. Being a minority, the transnational political authority was desired for a sense of unity of Islam in the Hindu majority British India. It was a pressure tactic for political space from the British, also negotiating for a space in the internal power struggle for Indian Muslims. Exhibition of this intent was clear from the association of this movement with the Non-Cooperation Movement for the freedom struggle which had changed the embedded traditional connotation of the Khilafat movement.

The suppression of the truth regarding power struggles in Turkey by Azad could be out of fear, as reality could have affected mobilization of Indian Muslims in the name of religion, also it would have made it difficult for him to combat the reformist faction of Muslims. Furthermore, Azad could have considered that the end of the Caliphate will affect his chances of becoming the head or Imam of the Indian Muslims.

An abrupt change occurred in the ideology of Azad after 1920s. This qualitative change in Azad was strategic and had a political bearing wherein religious ideology remains almost unaffected. In doing so, the Quar'anic dictums were used to approve and disapprove the Hindu-Muslim unity for the actualization of religio-political authority, the *Imam* of the Indian subcontinent's *umma*. *Imamat* is a section of the universal Khalifat of Islam. On the other hand, during Al-Hilal phase, he was quoting different verses of the Qur'an to emphasize erroneously that the Hindu-Muslim unity is against Islam. This could be interpreted as him using Qura'nic verses to suit his interests and his desires to become an *Imam*. However, this approach and related negotiations formed a religion-based identity and suppressed the demands of the 1916 Lucknow Pact of the reformist faction. Further, the partition of the British India in the name of religion and further division in *umma* had faded Azad's desire into a thin air.

The NCKM became the benchmark of Hindu-Muslim unity, which was short lived. The eruption of violence in Chauri Chaura and the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey occurred simultaneously, and the locus of the common struggle ceased to exist. The movement was suspended as a result of Hindu-Muslim friction. According to Mushirul Hasan, the Hindu-Muslim friction was considered normal, and the unity that prevailed during the Non-Cooperation Movement was an aberration.[54] However,

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the following questions are still unanswered: why did the aberration occur? Why did it last as long as it did? And why did it disappear?

During *Al-Hilal* phase of his scholarly-cum-religious life he articulated around Muslim nationalism and later adjusted to composite nationalism after 1920. Besides, the abolition of the Khilafat by the Turks themselves, further undermined the edifice of Azad's religious ideology and political schemes. However, through invocation of the Qur'an and its skillful malleable interpretations Azad could reconnect diametrically opposed concepts (Muslim and Composite Nationalism) with the Khilafat` movement. It is interesting to note that on the one hand, Muslim nationalism stressed on socio-religious and political consolidation and separation of Muslims, on the other, a composite nationalism falls under the banner of Indian secular nationalism which is based upon the unity of Hinds and Muslims and their shared history and experience in the Indian Subcontinent.

Secular nationalism is the territorial idea of the nation-state, on the contrary the Khilafat movement believed in the Universalist concept of *umma* (global community of Muslim believers), conceptually a supranational or transnational union that cuts across the borders of the nation-state. Question arises how were a composite nationalism and Khilafat movement with the zeal of pan-Islamist juxtaposed with each other? Under the pretext of Hindu-Muslim unity, Gandhi augmented an expression like *Ram Rajya*[55] which was rooted in revivalism and unity of Hindus (who are stratified around hegemonic caste system).[56] But *Ram Rajya* was never envisaged as a transnational reality by Gandhi, as Hindu population was limited to British India. One may conclude, Azad could relate the Khilafat with a composite nationalism as both share the similarity in intent to seek unity of the respective religious communities on the grounds of religious principles under the disguise of Hindu-Muslim unity or secular-cum-composite nationalism.

Conclusion

Peter Hardy suggests that although Muslim religious leaders advocated the formation of the coalition, they never abandoned their vision of a separate community. "The Ulemas visualized," says Hardy, "a free India, in which Muslims would live in a juristic ghetto for the Muslim law applies only to Muslims."[57] Muslims ghettoization is not unusual because the rejectionist faction wanted to achieve the same for the community with the Congress before independence. For the Congress before independence, accommodating the *ulema* was easier, who were inclined toward political authority based on the *Shari'ah* and not on socio-economic development, power sharing and education. Azad constructively worked to become the leader of the Indian Muslims by compromising his political ideology through theology. This behavior was disadvantageous to Muslim minority because Azad did not bargain for the political space for Muslims after independence and continued to endorse religion based Muslim identity, however, transforming religion based identity into politics of rights may take decades for Indian Muslims to achieve.

NOTES

1. The Swadeshi movement was started in 1850, but this movement started gaining momentum with the help of the Bengali middle-class intelligentsia over the partition of Bengal as early as 1903. It was intended to curb Bengali influence by not only placing Bengalis under two administrations, but also, by reducing them to a minority in Bengal itself. See, Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India :1885–1947*, Palgrave Maclillan, 1983, pp. 111–117. This movement failed to unite the Hindus and Muslims because Nawab Salimullah was a staunch supporter of the partition and later, in 1906, the Muslim

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League was officially founded at the educational conference held in Dhaka, which further consolidated the demand of Muslims for political space. See, Cholem Ullah, et al., "Role of Nawab Salimullah for the Foundation of AIML, Historical Research Letter", Vol. 10, 2014. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336748646_Role_of_Nawab_Salimullah_for_the_Foundation_of_AIML. (accessed 3 April 2020).

2. Resolution IX of the 1903 Congress; Resolution XIV of the 1904 Congress.
3. Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces' Muslims, 1860–1923, South Asian Studies*, Issue 16, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
4. "Militant" is a state defined category for those who agitate and engage in a war or act aggressively for their cause
5. Syed Nesar Ahmad, *Origins of Muslim Consciousness in India*, Westport, CT, U.S.A.: Greenwood Press, 2004, p. 123.
6. Present provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Uttrakhand were jointly known as United Provinces.
7. Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India: A Brief Survey, 1858–1947*, Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 149.
8. Agha Khan, *Sultan Mahmud Shah. The Memories of Agha Khan: World Enough and Time*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954, pp. 171, 186–187.
9. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p. 2.
10. Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Turkish-Pakistan Relations: Continuity and Change", in *Turkey in the 21st Century: Changing Role in World Politics*, eds. Mehmet Tahiroglu and Tareq Y. Ismael, Gazimagusa: Eastern Mediterranean University Press: Cyprus, 2000, pp. 143–144.
11. These reforms were further carried out by his sons Sultan Adbul Majid (2 July,1839- 25 June,1861), Sultan Abdulaziz (25 June, 1861–30 May, 1876). The last Sultan during the *Tanzimat* was Murad V (30 May, to 31 August, 1876) after his uncle Abdulaziz was deposed. He reigned for 93 days before being deposed on the grounds of mental illness and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Hamid II. See, Kevin Goodwin, *The Tanzimat and the Problem of Poltical Authority in the Ottoman Empire:1839–1876*, Honors' Projects Overview, No. 5, 2006. https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/honors_projects/5, (accessed 28 April 2020).
12. Tanzimat literally meaning reorganization, were a wide-ranging series of educational, political and economic reforms that began in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1870. They were an attempt at modernization to stop the decline of the Ottoman power.
13. Pan-Islamism refers to the movement which aims to unite the diversified Muslims on the basis of their common religion. There are several instances in the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), which emphasizes the concept of Muslim brotherhood and good feelings for the fellow Muslims. However, the political unity of Muslims under one Caliph lasted till the fall of the Umayyads and the establishment of Abbaside rule in 132 A.H. (750 A.D) in Baghdad. A parallel caliphate was founded by the Umayyad prince Abdur Rahman Al Dakhil in 138 A.H. (756 A.D) in Cordoba. Since then, Muslim theologians and scholars have not opposed the existence of more than one Muslim state in the world. See: Abdul Rauf, "Pan-Islamism and the North West Province of British India (1897–1918)", *Perceptions*, Winter, 2007, pp. 21–42.
14. Hamza Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement", *Comparative studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1997, pp. 1–16.
15. Al-Mutawakkil was living in exile in Egypt as a pensioner of the Mamluk ruler Baybars, who picked al-Mutawakkil's father, an uncle of last Abbasid Caliph, and installed him in Cairo with great pomp as, what scholars have labeled, a "pseudo-Caliph." Baybars, the most distinguished of the Mamluk rulers was originally a Turkoman slave and was defeated in 1517 by Selim I. See, Hamza Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement", *op. cit.*, pp. 1–16.
16. Lord Mornington Wellesley, the British Governor General of the East India company produced a letter from the Ottoman Caliph SALIM III in the name of Tipu Sultan stating not to oppose the British, but should make friendship with them. See, Abdul Rauf, "Pan-Islamism and the North West Province of British India (1897–1918)", *op. cit.*, pp. 21–42.
17. Ashraf Ali, "Khilafat Movement: A Factor in Muslim Separatism", in *Communal and Pan –Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan, New Delhi: Manohar, 1985, p. 85.
18. The Agha Khan writes;

> Lord Kitchener requested me to use all my influence with the Turks to persuade them not to join the Central Powers but to preserve their neutrality. His opinion was shared and supported by the Secretary of State for India, by the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and by the Prime

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> Minister Mr Asquith. Indeed, even the King, when I had the honor of lunching with him, referred to it,

Agha Khan, Sultan Mahmud Shah. The Memories of Agha Khan: World Enough and Time, op. cit., p. 132.

19. Sultan Wahihuddin Muhammed VI is commonly referred to as Mehmed VI Vahideddin. He was the 36th and last Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire until the empire dissolved after World War I. Retrieved Source: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mehmed-VI (accessed 28 April 2020).
20. The Ali brothers, Shaukat Ali (1873–1938) and Mohammed Ali Jauhar (1878–1931), were the other prominent leaders of the Khilafat Movement, which rallied support among the Indian Muslims for the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, whom they recognized as the Caliph.
21. He mentioned that it is regrettable that "Muslims (of today) have not seen Islam at its zenith. If they had, they would not be bowing their heads in subjection to the Hindus", Abul Kalam Azad, *Mazamin-e-Abul Kalam Azad,* Compiled by Syed Sifarish, Delhi: Hindustani Publication House, 1944, p. 17.
22. The Aligarh Movement was the departure from the apolitical heritage and pro-British Strategy of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan.
23. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, op. cit*., p. 42.
24. All-India Congress Committee and Khilafat meetings in Benares and Allahabad, CID Reports for June 1920, Home (Pol) D, 13, July 1920, NAI; Jamna Bhumi (Masilipatnam), Vol. 1, Issue 28–29, June 17 and 24, 1920.
25. UP Report, June 16, 1920, FRs for First half of June 19220, Home (Pol) 2D22, 96 July 1920; Proceedings of the Joint and Central Khilafat Conferences held in Allahabad, June 1–3, 1920, home (Pol) b, 109, July 1920, NAI.
26. Ram Malik, *Khutbaat-e-Azad*, New Delhi: Sahitiya Akademi, 1974, p. 29.
27. Ian Henderson Douglas, "Abul Kalam Azad : An Intellectual and Religious Biography", eds. Gail Minault & Christian W. Troll, Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 149.
28. Aijaz Ahmad, "Azad's Careers: Roads Taken and not Taken", in *Islam and Indian Nationalism, Reflection on AbulKalam Azad,* ed. Mushirul Hasan, New Delhi: Manohar, 2001, p. 153.
29. *Ibid*, p. 154.
30. The period had experienced two Home Rule league movements, which in their own limited way had tried to reach out to the masses. Gandhi, ever since he had come back to India and after familiarizing himself with Indian realities afresh, had already experimented with the Kheda and Champaran mode of mass-based agitation. The maiden attempt of forging a political society in the context of the Rowlatt Satyagraha, had borne some fruit and at the same time had also exposed the repressive character of the British rule, when its forces indulged in white terror in the Jallianwala Bagh on 13 April 1919. All these developments coalesced with the Khilafat issue in the context of Turkey's participation in the First World War and her subsequent defeat. See, Rizwan Qaiser, *Resisting Colonialism and Communal Politics: Maulana Azad and the Making of the Indian Nation*, New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 2011, pp. 76–77.
31. The Muslim political development in India before 1919 grew out of educational reform movement, Khilafat movement and committee provided the institutional nuclei for subsequent political organizations. See, Muhammad Naeem Qureshi, "*The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919–1924*" Doctoral dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1973.
32. After the victory of the First World War in 1918, it is the Treaty of Peace between the Allied (The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) and Associated Powers (Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Czecho-Slovakia) with Turkey signed at Serves on August 10, 1920. During the First World War, the Ottoman Empire belonged to the camp of the Central Powers. The treaty contained 433 articles out of which articles 138 & 139 were highly crucial as they state

> No inhabitant of territory detached from Turkey in accordance with the present Treaty shall be disturbed or molested on account of his political attitude after August 1, 1914, or of the determination of his nationality effected in accordance with the present Treaty

and

> Turkey renounces formally all rights of suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State. No power shall be exercised

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> directly or indirectly by any Turkish authority whatever in any territory detached from Turkey or of which the existing status under the present Treaty is recognised by Turkey

respectively. See, Raj Kumar Trivedi, "Mustafa Kemal and the Indian Khilafat Movement (to 1924)", *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Vol. 42, 1981, pp. 458–467. Retrieved Source: http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Sevres_ENG.pdf (accessed 28 April 2020).

33. Lord Kinross, Ataturk-*The Rebirth of a Nation,* Weidenfeld and Nicolson Press: London, 1964., p. 385 and Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 263.
34. Rizwan Qaiser, *Resisting Colonialism and Communal Politics: Maulana Azad and the Making of the Indian Nation*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
35. I. H. Douglas, "Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography", *op. cit.*
36. It is an Islamic practice of declaring on oath, one's allegiance to a particular leader. In an Islamic context, this oath is the standard procedure of pledging allegiance to a religious leader.
37. Firangi Mahal, had a much longer history than the Deoband school. It was founded during the reign of Aurangzeb (r.1658–1707), remained from then on one of the most important centers of Islamic learning in the subcontinent. It laid emphasis on Arabic grammar, logic, philosophy, and jurisprudence. See, Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
38. Dar Al-Ulum, Deoband, was founded in 1867, its founders were the students of the Delhi madrasah, were heirs of Shah Waliullah and his tradition and developed with the aim to regenerate Islamic social order. Shah Waliullah, the eighteenth-century reformer, whose many madrasahs were demolished and eliminated after the 1857 revolt in the drive of suppression of revolt. Retrieved Source: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Deoband-school, (accessed 28 April 2020).
39. Abul Kalam Azad, *Masala-e-Khilafat wa Jazirat al-Arab*, Delhi: Hali Publishing House, 1961, p. 296.
40. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious …* , *op. cit.*, p. 67. In December, 1910, Mohammad Ali Jinnah moved the resolution against "the extension of the principle of *Separate Communal Electorate* to Municipalities". quoted in Syed Raza, *Mazharul Haque: An Icon of Communal Harmony*, proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Vol. 74, 2013, p. 556. In 1913, the League at its Lucknow session - which Mohammad Ali Jinnah attended for the first time – decided to cooperate with the Congress and join in calls for "self-government".(Retrieved Source: https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/the_congress_league_scheme_1916__inc___aiml__1st%20January%201916 (accessed 28 April 2020).In October 1916 in Lucknow, the Lucknow Pact was reached between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League at the joint session during the time A. K. Fazlul Haq was the President. Retrieved Source: https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/the_congress_league_scheme_1916__inc___aiml__1st%20January%201916 (accessed 28 April 2020).
41. *Ibid*, p. 96.
42. *Ibid*, p. 132.
43. It is interesting to note that while editing *Lisan al-Sidq*, Azad described the Congress as a Hindu body.
44. It was *Jamiat-ul-Ulema* who declared the assassination of Swami Shradhanand as religious martyrdom but this was tolerated by the Congress to seek support of communal leadership of Muslims and to give a national image to the congress so to claim and bargain as the only representative of power share-ing. See,Sita Ram Sharma, *Indian Muslim League and Communalism*, APH Publishing Corporation, 1998, p. 124 and V.V. Nagarkar, *Genesis of Pakistan*, Allied Publishers, 1975, p. 163.
45. Several factors were allocated for the Malabar rebellion, (also known as the Moplah rebellion. Moplah or Mappila are the terms used for the Muslims of Malabar in Kerala, southern India) but the most dominant was the economic discontent which caused friction between Moplah peasants, who were mostly Muslims and the landlords, who were mostly Hindus. The call for the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat movement generated religious fervor between distinct entities, that is, between the oppressed and the oppressor. See, Gene Robert Thursby, *Aspects of Hindu-Muslim relations in British India: A study of Arya Samaj Activities, Government of India Policies and Communal Conflict in the Period 1923–1928*, Doctral Dissertation, Duke University, 1972, p. 23.
46. Rizwan Qaiser, *Resisting Colonialism and Communal Politics … , op. cit., p.102.*
47. A.R. Malihabadi, *Zikr-i-Azad, Maulana Azad ki Refaqat mein Artees Saal*, Calcutta: Ujala Press, 1960, p. 273.
48. Moin Shakir, *Azad, Islam and Nationalism*, Delhi: Kalamkar Prakashan (on behalf of Maulana Azad Memorial Committee), 1969, p. 24.
49. Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*, *op. cit*., p. 203.

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50. Ashraf Ali, "Appraisal of Azad's Religio-Political Trajectory", in Islam and Indian Nationalism: Reflection on Abul Kalam Azad, ed. Mushirul Hasan, New Delhi: Manohar Press, 1992, pp. 111–112.
51. Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz commonly known as Umar II, was the eight Umayyad Caliph and he was a matrilineal great grandson of the second Caliph, Umar ibn al-Khattab.
52. Ghulam Rasool Mehr, *Azad, Mas'ala-i-khilafat*, n.22 1920, p. 184.
53. Turkey's defeat in the First World War, imposition of the harsh Treaty of Serves and economic conditions in India created by the impact of the First World War produced circumstances favoring simultaneously the possibility of unity and disunity in Hindu-Muslim relations.
54. Mushirul Hasan, *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India:1916–1928*, New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1979, p. 194.
55. The Hindu Society is divided into four main varnas, namely, the Brahmins, the Kashtriyas, the Vaishyas, and the Shudras. The Varna System was prevalent during the Vedic period was mainly based on the division and specialization of labor, and occupation and the Kashtriya varna ranks second in the order. Varna is not synonymous with Caste system. Membership in the Varna system is not by the virtue of birth instead it is based on inherent nature and qualities, and mental differentiation. Therefore, social mobility is feasible from one Varna to another as per the Varna System, on the contrary, the Caste system is closed and rigid, one can become a member of a particular caste by the virtue of birth only, further it reinforces societal stratification through rigid continuity of lineage, hereditary, family and household. Caste is a misinterpreted version of the Varna system to dominate and exploit the marginalized within the Hindu society. Ram was the Aryan *Kashtriya* (warrior) King and his principles of governance were perceived as ideal. Thus, in the Indian context Ram Rajya is considered as the ideal state determined for good governance, economic prosperity and social justice. But this expression has invariably been invoked for political gain and to weave highly stratified Hindu caste system through Indian history.
56. Mushirul Hasan, "Communal and Revivalist Trends in Congress", *Social Scientist*, Vol. 8. No. 7, 1980, p. 63.
57. Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 194; Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908–1914*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.